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ABSTRACT 
  The Framers placed a high premium on jury independence and 
viewed the jury’s ability to dispense lenity as an important check on 
the legislative and executive branches. Many features of the criminal 
justice system are designed to interpose the jury between the accused 
and overzealous legislators and prosecutors. The general verdict and 
the absolute finality of acquittals, for example, empower the jury to 
acquit a defendant against the weight of the evidence. Although these 
features of the criminal justice system were conceived to protect 
defendants, they may be more harmful than helpful to defendants, 
given changes in the criminal justice system since the Founding. The 
proliferation of overlapping federal offenses, for instance, is a change 
that directly implicates the opacity of the general verdict. This Note 
explains that, in a trial resulting in an acquittal on some charges and a 
mistrial on other charges, a lack of transparency in what the jury has 
necessarily decided can harm the defendant by making it difficult for 
him to invoke the collateral estoppel protection. This Note proposes 
using special verdict forms to prevent jury inconsistency and provide 
clarity in cases involving multiple federal criminal offenses based on 
the same underlying facts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After thirteen weeks of trial and four days of deliberation, a jury 
acquitted former Enron executive Scott Yeager of securities fraud but 
failed to reach a verdict on the insider trading charges against him.1 
When the government sought to retry Yeager on the insider trading 
counts, he invoked the collateral estoppel protection2 as a means to 
avoid reprosecution. To invoke this protection, a defendant must 
establish that the prosecution is seeking to relitigate an issue that the 
jury already decided in an acquittal.3 In its effort to relitigate the 
insider trading counts on which the jury failed to reach a verdict, the 
government argued that Yeager could not invoke the collateral 
estoppel protection because he could not show that, in acquitting him 
of securities fraud, “the jury necessarily resolved in his favor an issue 
of ultimate fact” needed to convict him for insider trading.4 
Although the offenses of securities fraud and insider trading do 
not necessarily overlap, Yeager argued that the charges in his case 
were based on the same underlying conduct.5 But neither the 
indictment nor the jury’s acquittal of Yeager on the securities fraud 
count make this clear.6 And the district court (Yeager I)7and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Yeager II)8 
reached different conclusions about what Yeager’s jury necessarily 
 
 1. Yeager v. United States (Yeager III), 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2364 (2009) (noting that the trial 
court, after urging the jury to reach a final verdict on all counts, ultimately took the jury’s 
verdict after four full days of deliberation, entering judgment on the acquittals and declaring a 
mistrial on the hung counts). 
 2. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is a feature of the protection against double 
jeopardy. Anne Bowen Poulin, Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases: Reuse of Evidence After 
Acquittal, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1989). Criminal defendants like Yeager invoke the collateral 
estoppel protection to bar reprosecution by establishing that the earlier acquittal resolved an 
ultimate issue of the successive charge in the defendant’s favor. See id. (“Collateral estoppel is 
most commonly invoked to foreclose an issue resolved by an earlier acquittal and thus to bar 
prosecution entirely.”). Part I of this Note discusses the evolution of the collateral estoppel 
doctrine in the criminal context. 
 3. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), the leading Supreme Court case on collateral 
estoppel, explains that the protection “means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has 
once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated 
between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Id. at 443. 
 4. Yeager, 129 S. Ct. at 2370. 
 5. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 174–77 and accompanying text. 
 7. United States v. Yeager (Yeager I), 446 F. Supp. 2d 719 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
 8. United States v. Yeager (Yeager II), 521 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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decided through its acquittal.9 When the Supreme Court heard 
Yeager’s collateral estoppel challenge in 2009 (Yeager III),10 it 
adopted the Fifth Circuit’s reading of the record—that no rational 
jury could have acquitted Yeager of securities fraud without also 
acquitting him of the insider trading charges. Reversing the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding that the hung counts affected the preclusive effect of 
the acquitted counts, the Court held that, as a matter of law, an 
acquittal on some counts can have collateral estoppel effects in a 
successive prosecution of mistried counts.11 
Yeager III acknowledged that determining the preclusive effect 
of Yeager’s security fraud acquittal involved a “fact-intensive analysis 
of the voluminous record” that the court of appeals “may revisit . . . in 
light of the Government’s arguments before this Court.”12 The Court, 
however, failed to offer any guidance on how a lower court should 
proceed in determining what a jury necessarily decided in its 
acquittals.13 This Note proposes a solution that would simplify this 
analysis in cases like Yeager involving overlapping but not 
coextensive criminal offenses: special verdict forms tracking the 
common issues of law and fact for the jury to complete in deliberation 
and return in addition to its general verdict of guilt or acquittal. 
Part I explains why modern criminal defendants are vulnerable 
to successive prosecution, provides an overview of Supreme Court 
precedent on successive prosecution and collateral estoppel, and 
presents the Yeager case as an illustration of the problem. Part II 
explores the strong interest in preserving the jury’s independence in 
the criminal context through the lens of the Supreme Court’s “do-
nothing approach”14 to verdict inconsistency, the traditional disfavor 
of special verdicts, and the continuing debate over the doctrine of jury 
 
 9. Id. at 377–78 (rejecting the district court’s conclusion that the jury acquitted Yeager on 
the ground that he did not participate in the fraud and concluding instead that “the jury must 
have found when it acquitted Yeager that Yeager himself did not have any insider information 
that contradicted what was presented to the public”). 
 10. Yeager v. United States (Yeager III), 129 S. Ct. 2360 (2009). 
 11. Id. at 2362–63 (“The question presented in this case is whether an apparent 
inconsistency between a jury’s verdict of acquittal on some counts and its failure to return a 
verdict on other counts affects the preclusive force of the acquittals under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We hold that it does not.”). 
 12. Id. at 2370. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See infra note 70. 
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nullification.15 Part III recommends using special verdict forms to 
track issues of law and fact common to overlapping but not 
coextensive federal criminal offenses. 
I. THE PROBLEM: MODERN CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS INCREASINGLY 
VULNERABLE TO SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTION 
Criminal defendants have become more vulnerable to successive 
prosecution as the number of federal criminal offenses has grown. 
The Supreme Court noted this phenomenon in Ashe v. Swenson,16 in 
which it deemed the collateral estoppel doctrine part of the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy: 
[U]nder early federal criminal statutes . . . . [a] single course of 
criminal conduct was likely to yield but a single 
offense. . . . [W]ith . . . the extraordinary proliferation of 
overlapping . . . offenses, it became possible for prosecutors to spin 
out a startlingly numerous series of offenses from a single alleged 
criminal transaction. . . . [T]he potential for unfair and abusive 
reprosecutions became far more pronounced. . . . The federal courts 
soon recognized the need to prevent such abuses through the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel . . . .17 
Given the proliferation of federal offenses18 and strong 
prosecutorial incentives to maximize convictions,19 the threat of 
successive prosecution is a major concern for modern criminal 
defendants. Against this background, this Part considers the 
development of the Supreme Court’s double jeopardy jurisprudence 
and the role of collateral estoppel in preventing successive litigation. 
It concludes by using the Yeager case to highlight the difficulty of 
 
 15. This Note uses the terms nullification and lenity to refer to the same phenomenon, 
namely, “the jury’s return of a verdict of not guilty in a criminal case notwithstanding 
unequivocal evidence of guilt of the offense charged.” NANCY GERTNER & JUDITH H. MIZNER, 
THE LAW OF JURIES 191 (2d ed. 2009). 
 16. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
 17. Id. at 445 n.10. 
 18. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., 5 ENGAGE 23, 23 (2004), available at http://www. 
fed-soc.org/doclib/20080313_CorpsBaker.pdf (“There are over 4,000 offenses that carry criminal 
penalties in the United States Code. This is a record number, and reflects a one-third increase 
since 1980.”). 
 19. The Department of Justice allocates funds to U.S. Attorneys’ offices based on 
conviction rates. In addition, many prosecutors have political ambitions, and being “tough on 
crime” appeals to voters. Elizabeth T. Lear, Contemplating the Successive Prosecution 
Phenomenon in the Federal System, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 633−35 (1995). 
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making collateral estoppel determinations in cases in which the 
conduct alleged supports multiple overlapping but not coextensive 
charges. 
A.  Overcriminalization, Double Jeopardy, and the Collateral 
Estoppel Protection 
The redundancy and breadth of federal criminal offenses give 
prosecutors the ability to overcharge defendants.20 In addition to 
having an extensive array of overlapping and open-ended charges at 
their disposal, federal prosecutors have broad discretion over the 
charging decision.21 Prosecutors also control the decision whether to 
pursue a successive prosecution. (The main limits on this decision— 
the Department of Justice’s Petite Policy,22 resource constraints,23 and 
the attitudes of federal judges24—can be manipulated.) 
 
 20. The commentary on the implications of the explosive growth of federal criminal law is 
extensive. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and 
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747 passim (2005) (describing “common 
features connecting the different forms of overcriminalization”); Anne Bowen Poulin, Double 
Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A Proposed Approach, 92 GEO. L.J. 1183, 
1190 (2004) (“The proliferation of offenses is driven by political forces that encourage 
legislators to add to prosecutors’ arsenals and discourage the repeal of criminal laws. 
Legislatures respond to newsworthy events or trends with new criminal provisions that often 
overlap with existing provisions.”). 
 21. Lear, supra note 19, at 632 (“United States Attorneys have traditionally operated with 
almost complete autonomy. Even today the Justice Department rarely interferes in the charging 
decisions of local offices.” (footnotes omitted)); Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the 
Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. Rev. 1297, 1320–21 (1999) (“The prosecutor has 
nearly unfettered discretion to decide who to charge, what charges to file, and when to file 
them . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 22. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 530 (1960) (announcing the Department of 
Justice’s successive-prosecution policy for the first time). It is the Justice Department’s policy 
not to reprosecute unless the initial prosecution leaves “substantial federal 
interest[s] . . . demonstrably unvindicated.” UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-2.031 
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/2mcrm. 
htm#9-2.031. 
 23. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 710 n.15 (1993) (“Surely . . . the Government 
must be deterred from abusive, repeated prosecutions of a single offender for similar offenses 
by the sheer press of other demands upon prosecutorial and judicial resources.”). 
 24. Federal judges do not appreciate prosecutors wasting the court’s time and the public’s 
money without a substantial federal interest. Lear, supra note 19, at 631. 
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In addition to imposing great costs on individual defendants25 and 
the criminal justice system at large,26 successive prosecution implicates 
the Double Jeopardy Clause.27 The leading Supreme Court precedent 
on what constitutes the “same offence” for double jeopardy purposes 
is the Blockburger28 same-elements test, which provides that, so long 
as two offenses contain a separate element, they are not technically 
the same.29 The Court extended the same-elements test to the 
successive prosecution context in United States v. Dixon.30 
Three years before deciding Dixon, the Court had rejected the 
use of the Blockburger same-elements test in the successive 
prosecution context in Grady v. Corbin,31 which held that the 
government could not retry a defendant if proof of “conduct that 
constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been 
prosecuted” was required to convict.32 Dixon rejected this same-
conduct test as “unstable in application,” however, making Grady a 
short-lived precedent.33 
 
 25. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (“To permit a second trial after an 
acquittal, however mistaken the acquittal may have been, would present an unacceptably high 
risk that the Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so 
that ‘even though innocent he may be found guilty.’” (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 
184, 188 (1957))); Green, 355 U.S. at 187−88 (“[T]he State with all its resources and power 
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, 
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a 
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though 
innocent he may be found guilty.”). 
 26. See Lear, supra note 19, at 647 (explaining that crowded federal dockets are such that 
every criminal case that goes forward for reprosecution means that one less civil jury trial will 
occur); id. at 648−49 (describing successive prosecutions as a resource drain on U.S. Attorneys’ 
offices); id. at 650−51 (explaining that successive prosecution undermines confidence in the 
system). 
 27. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person “shall . . . be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 28. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
 29. Id. at 304 (“The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a 
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there 
are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other 
does not.”). 
 30. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 697 (1993). 
 31. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by Dixon, 509 U.S. 688. 
 32. Id. at 510 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 33. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 709. Two years after Grady was decided, the Court had to recognize 
a major exception to the same-conduct test based on the “longstanding authority” that 
prosecution for a substantive offense does not bar subsequent prosecution for conspiring to 
commit that offense. See United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 390–91 (1992) (holding that an 
underlying offense and conspiracy to commit that offense were “separate offenses for double 
jeopardy purposes”). 
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Unlike the Grady same-conduct test, the Blockburger same-
elements test embraced by Dixon in the successive prosecution 
context focuses on the statutory definitions of crimes to determine 
whether they are the “same offence.”34 Because the Blockburger test 
does not take the conduct alleged into account, it is, as Dixon 
suggested, easier to apply than the Grady same-conduct test. It is, 
however, also easier for prosecutors to manipulate. It would be 
permissible under Blockburger for a prosecutor unsatisfied with an 
acquittal to reprosecute the same conduct by charging the defendant 
with an offense containing one element not contained in the initially 
charged offense. Fortunately for criminal defendants, there is a 
protection besides the Blockburger test that may shield them from 
such an overzealous prosecutor: the collateral estoppel doctrine. 
The collateral estoppel doctrine bars successive prosecution 
requiring relitigation of issues already decided in the defendant’s 
favor.35 It thus serves an important role in the Court’s double 
jeopardy jurisprudence by providing a backstop for the Blockburger 
same-elements test. In the absence of the collateral estoppel 
protection, prosecutors could harass defendants through successive 
prosecution on technically separate offenses involving identical 
conduct.36 The collateral estoppel doctrine is now recognized as part 
of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against double jeopardy,37 but it 
originally developed in the civil context. In United States v. 
Oppenheimer,38 Justice Holmes made the case for extending the 
collateral estoppel protection to the criminal context, reasoning that, 
“[i]t cannot be that the safeguards of the person . . . are less than 
those that protect from a liability in debt.”39 
The collateral estoppel doctrine’s civil roots have complicated 
the doctrine’s application in the criminal context. In the civil context, 
special verdicts can be used to determine what a jury necessarily 
 
 34. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696 (“The same-elements test . . . inquires whether each offense 
contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the ‘same offence’ and double 
jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution.”). 
 35. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
 36. According to Justice Souter, “[i]f a separate prosecution were permitted for every 
offense arising out of the same conduct, the government could manipulate the definitions of 
offenses, creating fine distinctions among them and permitting a zealous prosecutor to try a 
person again and again for essentially the same criminal conduct.” Dixon, 509 U.S. at 747 
(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 37. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970). 
 38. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916). 
 39. Id. at 87. 
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decided. In the criminal context, however, the general verdict makes 
this analysis very difficult, as recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Ashe: 
Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general 
verdict . . . this approach requires a court to ‘examine the record of a 
prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, 
charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational 
jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that 
which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.’40 
Ashe cautioned lower courts to approach the determination of 
what a jury necessarily decided “with realism and rationality.”41 
Taking a more “technically restrictive” approach, the Court 
explained, “would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule 
of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case 
where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of 
acquittal.”42 
The Ashe analysis is a fact-intensive one requiring close 
examination of the prior proceeding’s record including the pleadings, 
evidence, and indictment.43 In this way, it is more like the Grady 
same-conduct test, which looks at the conduct underlying the 
successive charges, than the Blockburger same-elements test, which 
looks only at the formal elements of the offenses. But the Ashe 
analysis may suffer from the same instability that led the Court to 
reject the Grady same-conduct test in Dixon.44 In Yeager’s case, for 
example, the district court and the Fifth Circuit reached critically 
different conclusions after conducting the Ashe analysis.45 
B.  A Closer Look at United States v. Yeager 
The prosecution of Enron Broadband Services (EBS) executive 
Scott Yeager readily illustrates the problems posed by a general 
verdict of acquittal for a defendant seeking to bar a successive 
criminal prosecution. In 2004, a grand jury indicted Yeager on 126 
 
 40. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added) (quoting Daniel K. Mayers & Fletcher L. 
Yarbough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38–39 
(1960)). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See supra note 33. 
 45. See supra notes 7–9. 
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counts of five federal offenses: (1) conspiracy to commit securities 
and wire fraud, (2) securities fraud, (3) wire fraud, (4) insider trading, 
and (5) money laundering.46 Specifically, the indictment alleged that 
Yeager and two other senior EBS executives purposefully misled the 
public—in an effort to inflate the value of EBS stock and enrich 
themselves—about an intelligent telecommunications network that 
EBS was developing.47 The allegedly false statements and material 
omissions were made at an analyst conference in 2000 and in press 
releases.48 
The jury acquitted Yeager of the securities fraud, wire fraud, and 
conspiracy charges,49 but failed to reach a verdict on the insider 
trading and money laundering charges.50 When the government 
sought to retry Yeager on the hung counts, Yeager challenged the 
successive prosecution on collateral estoppel grounds, arguing that 
“(1) the acquitted . . . securities fraud . . . counts allege the same 
factual allegations that underpin the insider trading counts, and (2) 
the evidence presented at trial on the acquitted counts pertaining to 
alleged false statements and omissions made at the 2000 analyst 
conference and in press releases, is the very same evidence the 
government submitted on the insider trading counts.”51 
The district court and the Fifth Circuit read the tea leaves of the 
jury’s acquittal of Yeager on the fraud counts differently. The Fifth 
Circuit concluded in Yeager II that “the jury must have found when it 
 
 46. United States v. Yeager (Yeager I), 446 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“Count 
One [of the indictment] charged Defendant Yeager with conspiracy to commit securities fraud 
and wire fraud. Count Two of the Indictment charged Defendant Yeager with the substantive 
offense of securities fraud in connection with allegedly false statements and material omissions 
at a January 20, 2000 Analyst Conference. Counts Three through Six charged Defendant 
Yeager with the substantive offense of wire fraud in connection with press releases issued by 
Enron Broadband Services on January 31, 2000 through May 15, 2000. Counts Twenty-Seven 
through Forty-Six charged Defendant Yeager with insider trading based on trades of 
Enron stock made on January 21, 2000 through August 23, 2000. Counts Sixty-Seven through 
One Hundred Sixty-Five charged Defendant Yeager with money laundering based on 
transactions on February 7, 2000 through September 18, 2001.” (citations omitted)). 
 47. United States v. Yeager (Yeager II), 521 F.3d 367, 370 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The indictment 
alleged that [the three EBS defendants] purposely sought to deceive the public by making false 
statements about EBS’s progress and financial condition. . . . The indictment also charged [the 
three EBS defendants] with selling millions of dollars of Enron stock while making these false 
statements.”). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 376. 
 50. “The jury hung on 20 counts of insider trading and 99 counts of money laundering”  
that were based on insider trading. Id. 
 51. Yeager I, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 726. 
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acquitted Yeager that Yeager himself did not have any insider 
information that contradicted what was presented to the public.”52 In 
contrast, the district court in Yeager I interpreted the jury’s acquittal 
to say that Yeager did not knowingly and willingly participate in a 
scheme to defraud in connection with the 2000 Analyst Conference 
and press releases, but not that he lacked insider information.53 In 
Yeager II, however, the Fifth Circuit ruled out the possibility that the 
jury acquitted Yeager based on a finding that he did not participate in 
making the alleged material misrepresentations.54 
Despite reading his securities fraud acquittal differently, both the 
district court and the Fifth Circuit denied Yeager’s motion to dismiss 
the counts in the new indictment. The district court concluded that 
“Yeager’s acquittal on the conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud 
counts of the Indictment does not completely bar the government 
from retrying [him] on the charges of insider trading and money 
laundering.”55 Alternatively, relying on United States v. Larkin,56 the 
Fifth Circuit concluded that the presence of the apparently 
inconsistent hung counts “ma[de] it impossible . . . to decide with any 
certainty what the jury necessarily determined” and that therefore 
Yeager could not invoke the collateral estoppel protection.57 
 
 52. Yeager II, 521 F.3d at 378. 
 53. Yeager I, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 735 (“[T]he Court finds that the jury necessarily 
determined that Defendant Yeager did not knowingly and willfully participate or agree to 
participate in a scheme to defraud in connection with the alleged false statements or material 
omissions made at the analyst conference and press releases. . . . [This] defense, if believed by 
the jury, would not negate the government’s evidence and contention that Yeager possessed and 
used material nonpublic information at the time he made trades of Enron stock. Yeager’s 
defense would only establish that Defendant Yeager did not participate in the overall scheme to 
defraud.”). 
 54. At Yeager’s trial, the judge instructed the jury that, to convict Yeager on securities 
fraud, the government needed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that “Yeager participated 
in making material representations or omissions” (first element) and that “Yeager acted 
‘willfully, knowingly and with intent to defraud’” (second element). Yeager II, 521 F.3d at 377. 
According to the Fifth Circuit’s reading of the record, the jury could have acquitted Yeager of 
securities fraud “on the basis of the first element by concluding that there were no 
misrepresentations or omissions made at the conference” or “on the basis of the second element 
by finding that Yeager did not knowingly make misrepresentations and omissions because he 
believed the presentations were truthful,” that is, by concluding that Yeager acted in good faith. 
Id. 
 55. Yeager I, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 735. 
 56. United States v. Larkin, 605 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 57. Yeager II, 521 F.3d at 378. The court relied on circuit precedent in reaching this 
holding. Id. at 379 (citing Larkin, 605 F.2d at 1370). 
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In Yeager III, the Supreme Court based its narrow legal holding 
on the Fifth Circuit’s reading of the record58 and reversed the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding, overruling Larkin and holding an inconsistent hung 
count to be a “nonevent” that does not affect the Ashe analysis.59 
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the disparate readings of 
the jury’s acquittal in Yeager I and II, it “decline[d] to engage in a 
fact-intensive analysis of the voluminous record” to determine what 
the jury necessarily decided when it acquitted Yeager.60 Instead, 
without providing any guidance on how to execute this task, the 
Court left the Fifth Circuit to “revisit its factual analysis [in Yeager II] 
in light of the Government’s arguments [in Yeager III].”61  
As this Part has explained, Ashe provided lower courts with 
some general direction about what to look at in determining what a 
jury necessarily decided in acquitting a defendant.62 Specifically, Ashe 
directs courts to conduct a fact-intensive examination of the prior 
proceeding’s record.63 On remand, the Fifth Circuit explained that 
“freed from the chains of Larkin it is clear that under our initial Ashe 
analysis the jury made a finding in acquitting Yeager that precludes 
prosecution on insider trading.”64 The court of appeals declined the 
Supreme Court’s “invitation to revisit” the Ashe analysis, denying the 
government’s motion requesting a hearing to reconsider other 
possible grounds for the jury’s acquittals.65 
The dramatically different interpretations by the Fifth Circuit 
and the district court regarding the jury’s decision to acquit Yeager 
raise questions about the Ashe analysis. Major collateral estoppel 
consequences flow from this analysis. Indeed, Yeager I and II’s 
different readings of the jury’s acquittal carry opposite collateral 
 
 58. Yeager v. United States (Yeager III), 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2370 (2009) (“Our grant of 
certiorari was based on the assumption that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the record 
was correct.”). 
 59. Id. at 2367 (“Unlike Ashe, the case before us today entails a trial that included multiple 
counts rather than a trial for a single offense. And, while Ashe involved an acquittal for that 
single offense, this case involves an acquittal on some counts and a mistrial declared on others. 
The reasoning in Ashe is nevertheless controlling because, for double jeopardy purposes, the 
jury’s inability to reach a verdict on the insider trading counts was a nonevent and the acquittals 
on the fraud counts are entitled to the same effect as Ashe’s acquittal.”). 
 60. Id. at 2370. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 63. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 64. United States v. Yeager (Yeager IV), 334 F. App’x 707, 709 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 65. Id. 
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estoppel implications. Yeager I’s conclusion that the jury did not 
necessarily decide the insider trading charges against him would not 
bar a successive prosecution. The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that “the 
possession of insider information was a critical issue of ultimate fact 
in all of the charges” would, however, trigger the collateral estoppel 
protection.66 Discrepancies seem inevitable when courts have only a 
general verdict in hand. 
II.  NULLIFICATION NOSTALGIA IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Many features of the criminal justice system, including the 
general verdict, are justified by nullification—the jury’s “implicit 
power” to exercise lenity and acquit a defendant against the weight of 
the evidence.67 There is great debate over whether juries have the 
right to nullify, and the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed 
the question. Many of the Court’s decisions, however, including its 
approach to inconsistent verdicts, exhibit nostalgia for the Framer’s 
view of nullification as a tyranny-preventive device.68 This Part first 
explores the Supreme Court’s invocation of nullification in United 
States v. Powell,69 the leading case on inconsistent verdicts. It then 
proceeds to reexamine the traditional disfavor of special verdicts in 
the criminal context based on preserving the possibility of 
nullification. This Part concludes by describing how the nullification 
debate has evolved from the time of the Framers. 
A.  Nullification-Regarding Features of the Criminal Justice System 
1. The Supreme Court’s Do-Nothing Approach70 to Verdict 
Inconsistency.  Internal inconsistency71 in the jury’s verdict makes a 
 
 66. Yeager III, 129 S. Ct. at 2368–69. 
 67. Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: An Empirical Perspective, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
425, 426 (2008) (“The criminal jury’s power to deliver a verdict counter to both law and 
evidence resides in the fact that a general verdict requires no explanation by the jury.” (footnote 
omitted)). But see id. (“[J]ury nullification does not always lead to ‘merciful’ acquittals, but 
rather may engage jurors’ emotions that may result in a vindictive verdict.” (footnote omitted)). 
 68. See id. (“The framers of the U.S. Constitution considered the jury in criminal trials to 
be a fundamental safeguard against the power of the government.” (footnote omitted)). 
 69. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984). 
 70. Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent 
Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 771, 772 (1998). 
 71. See Leipold, supra note 21, at 1349–50 (“When a jury acquits a person of one crime 
(accepting a bribe, for example) but convicts them of a related crime (failure to report the bribe 
income) the verdict is internally inconsistent.”). 
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defendant vulnerable to successive prosecution by making it more 
difficult to determine what a jury necessarily decided and therefore 
more difficult to invoke the collateral estoppel protection. Verdict 
inconsistency indicates that the jury failed to follow the court’s 
instructions, but it does not indicate the reason for this failure. The 
jury may have been confused or mistaken about the evidence or 
instructions,72 which is more likely in cases like Yeager, in which there 
is legal and evidentiary complexity involving multiple offenses with 
common issues of underlying fact.73 
Inconsistency can also result when the jury decides to exercise its 
power to dispense lenity.74 The Supreme Court has held that 
inconsistent verdicts must stand because there is no way to tell 
whether the source of verdict inconsistency was “mistake, 
compromise, or lenity.”75 Although courts engage in various pre-
verdict attempts to prevent the jury from making mistakes,76 they are 
unwilling to disturb the possibility that the jury exercised lenity once 
a verdict has been returned. Thus, early intervention to prevent 
inconsistency borne of jury mistake and confusion is crucial; once the 
jury returns inconsistent verdicts, nothing can be done. 
The Supreme Court established its do-nothing approach to 
inconsistent verdicts in Powell. A jury acquitted Betty Lou Powell of 
possessing cocaine with intent to distribute but convicted her of using 
a telephone to facilitate that crime.77 Powell sought to reverse the 
inconsistent conviction on collateral estoppel grounds, arguing that 
the jury’s acquittal on the possession charge necessarily decided an 
 
 72. See Muller, supra note 70, at 798 (“Through mistake or confusion, a jury might 
misunderstand the elements of the crime, the allocation of the burden of proof, the effect of the 
defendant’s failure to testify, or other key aspects of the court’s instructions.”). 
 73. See id. at 776 (“One of the most fertile settings for producing logically inconsistent 
verdicts is the compound crime—the crime . . . that has another charged crime as one of its 
elements. As these sorts of offenses have proliferated in recent years, so too has the opportunity 
for inconsistent verdicts.” (footnote omitted)). 
 74. Leipold, supra note 21, at 1350 (noting that a jury may “t[ake] pity on the defendant 
and partially nullif[y] the charges”). 
 75. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984). 
 76. See Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 883−84 
(1999) (“There is no dispute that jury mistakes are to be avoided. To this end, courts have 
experimented with a variety of changes in procedure, such as allowing jurors to take notes, to 
submit written questions to the judge, to receive preliminary instructions, to take written 
instructions into the jury room, and to be instructed in plain language that laypersons can 
understand. All of these procedural changes, many drawn from empirical studies, are directed 
toward helping juries avoid mistakes.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 77. Powell, 469 U.S. at 60. 
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element of the phone count.78 The Supreme Court refused to reverse 
her conviction, reasoning that, “the jury, convinced of guilt, [may 
have] properly reached its conclusion on the compound offense, and 
then through mistake, compromise, or lenity arrived at an 
inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense.”79 In addition to the 
possible exercise of lenity, the Powell Court noted the government’s 
inability to seek review and its general reluctance to speculate about 
jury deliberations as reasons for doing nothing about the 
inconsistency.80 
2. Reexamining the Traditional Disfavor of Special Verdicts.  Like 
the do-nothing approach to inconsistent verdicts, unwillingness to 
look behind the general verdict has been justified by the need to 
preserve the jury’s independence and the possibility of nullification.81 
Although it is a common refrain that special verdicts are disfavored in 
the criminal context, “[t]his truism is often recited 
reflexively . . . rather than as a conclusion following sustained 
analysis.”82 There is no absolute prohibition against the use of special 
verdicts in the criminal context.83 Indeed, they are required in federal 
treason cases.84 In addition, when it is important for purposes of 
federal sentencing to determine a particular fact, supplemental 
special interrogatories are often used.85 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 65. 
 80. Id. at 68−69. 
 81. See United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 416 (3d Cir. 1982) (“Some of the antipathy 
toward special verdicts in criminal trials has its roots in the doctrine of ‘jury nullification.’”). 
 82. Leipold, supra note 21, at 1355 n.192. 
 83. Desmond, 670 F.2d at 416. 
 84. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (requiring a finding of an overt act in treason cases, or a 
confession in open court). 
 85. For example, special interrogatories have been utilized in determining whether and 
what type of weapon the defendant used in a violent or drug-related crime. See, e.g., United 
States v. Peña-Lora, 225 F.3d 17, 30 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[T]he district courts are vested with 
discretion to employ special verdict forms in [criminal] cases—i.e. where a section 924(c) count 
[of knowingly importing into, or possessing within, the United States firearms or ammunition] 
lists both a regular ‘firearm’ and a ‘machinegun.’” (second alteration in original)); United 
States v. Sims, 975 F.2d 1225, 1235–36 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[The court may] submit[] special 
interrogatories . . . to the jury, requiring that if the jury returns a guilty verdict . . . it must specify 
which category . . . of weapons it . . . found the defendant was using or carrying.”); United 
States v. Smith, 938 F.2d 69, 70 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing how special verdicts, though 
“generally not favored in criminal cases,” are permitted, including in situations where “the 
defendant’s offense turns on factual findings”). Special verdict forms have also been used to 
determine “factors that increase applicable statutory maximum sentences,” James K. Robinson, 
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Courts have used special verdicts as a means to prevent jury 
confusion and mistake in complex criminal cases. The Ninth Circuit, 
for example, requires special verdicts “when a court permits facts 
which pose a genuine possibility of juror confusion to go to the 
jury.”86 The increasing use of special verdicts in RICO cases87 
indicates judicial awareness that greater complexity limits the 
effectiveness of general verdicts as a defendant-protective device. In 
United States v. Coonan,88 for example, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit approved special interrogatories designed to prevent 
prejudicial spillover between multiple defendants and to vindicate the 
defendant’s constitutional right to unanimity on the predicate 
offenses.89 
General verdicts are thought to preserve the jury’s ability to 
dispense lenity against the weight of the evidence because the jury, 
when it returns a general verdict of acquittal, does not have to explain 
its decision, which is absolutely final.90 It was not uncommon in 
seventeenth-century criminal trials for a judge to force a jury to 
disclose its reasons, sending the jury back for further discussion if the 
judge disagreed with its reasoning.91 Therefore, the Framers were 
concerned that special verdicts could be used to hamstring the jury 
into convicting a defendant.92 In 1670, the famous Bushell’s Case93 
 
Preface: Thirtieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and 
Courts of Appeals, 1999-2000, 89 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1048–49 (2001) (explaining that after the 
“Apprendi decision . . . led to a flood of challenges to federal sentences,” federal prosecutors 
began drafting special verdict forms to be used in submitting to the jury factors that increase 
applicable statutory maximum sentences), and aggravating factors in capital cases, see Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 585 (2002) (holding that juries and not judges must find aggravating 
circumstances in death penalty cases). 
 86. United States v. Delgado, 4 F.3d 780, 792 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 87. See Cynthia L. Randall, Comment, Acquittals in Jeopardy, Criminal Collateral Estoppel 
and the Use of Acquitted Act Evidence, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 319 (1992) (“Increasingly, courts 
are using special interrogatories in RICO cases to compel the jury to specify the predicate acts 
upon which a RICO conviction is based.” (footnote omitted)). 
 88. United States v. Coonan, 839 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 89. The prosecution offered multiple predicate offenses, and the interrogatories asked the 
jury to find that each RICO defendant participated in two predicate acts. Id. at 890. 
 90. See Marder, supra note 76, at 914 (explaining that the general verdict, where “[the jury] 
says only whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, and provides no reasons for its decision,” 
gives the jury a private space to “interpret[] the judge’s instructions and decide[] whether and 
how to follow them”). 
 91. John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 284–
89 (1978). 
 92. Cf. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969) (discussing how, if a juror is 
asked progressive questions, the “juror, wishing to acquit, may be formally catechized. . . . [and] 
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“prohibited the Crown from punishing the jury for verdicts deemed 
unlawful or rebellious.”94 And in the eighteenth century, a colonial 
jury “[f]amously . . . acquitted printer John Peter Zenger of sedition 
when he certainly violated the local law prohibiting criticisms aimed 
at representatives . . . of the Crown.”95 
Despite the origins of the general verdict as a jury- and 
defendant-protective device, “it is not obvious that preserving the 
right to nullify is worth the cost to innocent defendants, who might be 
relieved of the burdens of a false charge by a more informative 
verdict.”96 As one federal judge has explained, “the general 
verdict . . . confers on the jury a vast power to commit error and do 
mischief by loading it with technical burdens far beyond its ability to 
perform, by confusing it in aggregating instead of segregating the 
issues, and by shrouding in secrecy and mystery the actual results of 
its deliberations.”97 The general verdict obscures whether the jury has 
exercised nullification or made a mistake about the evidence or the 
law.98 
As the different readings of Yeager’s acquittal in Yeager I and II 
demonstrate, it is almost impossible to determine from the words 
“not guilty” what the jury has necessarily decided. This 
determination, however, is required to invoke the collateral estoppel 
protection, which the Supreme Court has deemed part of the Fifth 
Amendment right against double jeopardy. Thus, in cases like Yeager 
involving multiple offenses with common issues of underlying fact, 
the opacity of the general verdict imperils the defendant’s access to 
an important constitutional protection. 
B.  The Evolution of the Great Nullification Debate 
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the 
nullification question, and its allusions to nullification are 
 
led to vote for a conviction which, in the large, he would have resisted,” but noting that “the 
jury, as the conscience of the community, must be permitted to look at more than logic”). 
 93. Bushell’s Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.). 
 94. Horowitz, supra note 67, at 428 (footnote omitted). 
 95. Id. at 429 (footnote omitted). 
 96. Leipold, supra note 21, at 1355. 
 97. Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1948). 
 98. See RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 258 (2003) (“A 
wrongheaded acquittal . . . is not necessarily nullification. . . . Identifying and separating 
‘mistake’ from ‘nullification’ is difficult, making accurate assessment of data on the incidence of 
either difficult.”). 
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inconsistent. On the one hand, the Court has characterized the act of 
nullification as “lawless,”99 producing verdicts returned for 
“impermissible reasons.”100 On the other hand, the Court has 
explained that it “would be totally alien to our notions of criminal 
justice” to prohibit jury nullification.101 The Powell Court invoked the 
latter idea when it described “the jury’s historic function[] in criminal 
trials[] as a check against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power 
by the Executive Branch.”102 This tyranny-preventive view of the jury 
is also apparent in the Supreme Court’s decision incorporating the 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.103 
Despite efforts to silence nullification advocacy in the 
courtroom,104 the nullification debate has continued to sound in both 
academic circles and as part of a grass roots movement.105 Whereas 
the opponents of nullification see it as a form of unchecked power to 
be avoided, its champions see nullification as a desirable and 
independent constitutional good. Other commentators accept 
nullification as an inevitable corollary to courts’ traditional reluctance 
to engage in post-verdict scrutiny.106 
 
 99. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984). 
 100. Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981). 
 101. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976). 
 102. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984). 
 103. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 145, 156 (1968) (“[T]he jury trial 
provisions . . . reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power—a reluctance 
to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of 
judges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other 
respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in 
the determination of guilt or innocence.”). 
 104. See generally Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and 
Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433 (1998) (discussing the history of jury nullification 
in state and federal courts, and arguing that the Constitution does not support jury nullification 
and that great costs will result if the power is expanded beyond the level at which it exists 
today). 
 105. NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 194 (2005) (“Courts, by opting not to instruct 
juries on nullification, have created a void into which special-interest groups and individuals 
have stepped. These special-interest groups and individuals are often willing to undermine 
respect for the jury and the court because its [sic] serves their organizational goals.”). High-
profile cases like the O.J. Simpson and Rodney King trials, suspected by many commentators to 
be examples of nullification, have fueled this debate. Marder, supra note 76, at 877–78. 
 106. See JONAKAIT, supra note 98, at 249 (“The doctrine that jurors cannot be held legally 
accountable for their decisions . . . protects juries if they acquit in disregard of the law.”). Every 
student of evidence reads Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 116–17, 127 (1987), in which the 
Supreme Court refused to allow jurors who came forward to report shocking drug and alcohol 
abuse to testify in a post-verdict evidentiary hearing. This decision serves several important 
policy goals including protecting jurors from harassment by disgruntled litigants and preserving 
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Professor Nancy Marder has explained that one’s view of 
nullification depends on one’s conception of the jury’s proper role.107 
Adherents of the conventional view—that the jury’s role is to find 
facts108—see jury nullification as intruding on the province of the 
judiciary, legislature, and executive109 and threatening the rule of 
law.110 Under an alternative conception of the jury, which Professor 
Marder calls the “process view,”111 nullification provides the 
legislative and executive branches with valuable feedback.112 
According to this view, the jury safeguards the individual defendant 
by bridging the gap between necessarily general criminal statutes113 
and specific crimes and by checking national laws out of touch with 
local standards.114 
Jurors inevitably approach their task armed with more than 
logic,115 and this is seen, for the most part, as a desirable feature of the 
criminal justice system. Judge Learned Hand, for example, 
characterized the jury verdict as providing “slack [in] the enforcement 
of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of current 
 
finality of process. Id. at 119–25. As the Tanner Court acknowledged, the jury system would not 
likely “survive [post-verdict] efforts to perfect it.” Id. at 120. 
 107. Marder, supra note 76, at 880. 
 108. Judges typically instruct juries that they are factfinders. Id. at 904. 
 109. See id. at 905 (“The jury’s role is narrowly envisioned by the conventional view, and to 
the extent juries perform more than fact finding or application of law in a narrow sense, they are 
seen as overstepping their bounds in the political schema and threatening the other branches’ 
roles.”); id. at 907 (“[J]uries that nullify in response to social conditions . . . harm the legislature 
and executive . . . by appropriating tasks that are best left to these other branches.”). 
 110. See id. (“To the judge . . . jury nullification is a form of insurrection, and not 
surprisingly, judges often write or speak about nullification as leading to ‘chaos’ or ‘anarchy.’ 
Jury nullification is a threat not only to the judge’s task, but also to the premise of the judicial 
system, which is that laws should be applied uniformly.” (footnote omitted)). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at 926 (“[A] jury that acquits so as not to apply the law to a particular defendant 
provides feedback to the executive and a jury that acquits so as not to apply a bad law provides 
feedback to the legislature . . . .”). 
 113. See id. at 927 (explaining that “the nullifying jury . . . can [] be viewed as assisting the 
legislature” because legislators must “create general laws both because they cannot foresee 
every variation that may arise and also because legislators may have competing views about 
what should be included in legislation and must settle for broad language if any laws are to be 
passed”). 
 114. See id. at 929 (“This occurred with the Fugitive Slave Act, in which Northern juries 
often refused to give effect to the law.”). 
 115. Id. at 911 (“[The jurors] must engage in a weighing of the evidence presented by the 
State, and it is likely that this amorphous process . . . will be shaped by attitudes they hold on a 
wide range of issues, from whether they distrust the State and worry about it abusing its power 
to how vulnerable they feel to crime . . . .”). 
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ethical conventions.”116 In Duncan v. Lousiana,117 in which the 
Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, 
the Court invoked a classic study of the jury to support the 
proposition that “when juries differ with the result at which the judge 
would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of the 
very purposes for which they were created and for which they are 
now employed.”118 
The Supreme Court’s conception of the jury’s proper role is 
nevertheless uncertain, and the Court has never spoken directly to 
the nullification question. In Sparf v. United States,119 the Court held 
that it is the court’s duty to define the law and the jury’s duty to apply 
it.120 Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, suggested that the Framers 
were not uniformly in favor of preserving the possibility of 
nullification and expressed concern about giving juries too much 
power: 
If a petit jury can rightfully exercise [nullification] over one statute 
of Congress, they must have an equal right and power over any 
other statute, and indeed over all the statutes. . . . If this power be 
once admitted, petit jurors will be superior to the national 
legislature, and its laws will be subject to their control.121 
In a later case, though, the Court stepped back from its anti-
nullification position, explaining that Sparf does “not support [the] 
concept of the criminal jury as mere factfinder.”122 The Court drew a 
distinction between “tell[ing] the jury what the applicable law is” and 
“requir[ing] the jury to apply the law,”123 which the Court held would 
be inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment. 
The notion that the jury serves as a final check on prosecutorial 
and legislative authority accords well with the Framers’ system of 
checks and balances; however, jury nullification may also be a 
 
 116. United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir. 1942), rev’d on other 
grounds, 317 U.S. 269 (1942). 
 117. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 118. Id. at 157 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 4 n.2 
(1966)). 
 119. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895). 
 120. Id. at 100–03. 
 121. Id. at 71 (quoting United States v. Callendar, 25 F. Cas. 239, 256 (C.C. Va. 1800)). 
 122. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511–15 (1995). 
 123. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF 
DEMOCRACY 68 (2000). 
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dangerous form of unchecked power.124 Some historical examples of 
nullification, such as Southern white juries’ refusal to convict whites 
charged with crimes against African Americans, are rightly 
condemned.125 In the modern era, so-called “Bronx juries” have 
stirred up concerns about abuse of the jury’s unreviewable 
discretion.126 Furthermore, it may no longer be as desirable for juries 
to second-guess the legislature as it was in the Framers’ day.127 
III.  THE SOLUTION: SPECIAL VERDICT FORMS CLARIFYING THE 
ISSUES OF ULTIMATE FACT COMMON TO OVERLAPPING OFFENSES 
Improving the clarity of the jury’s verdict using special verdict 
forms would benefit defendants like Yeager seeking to invoke the 
collateral estoppel protection. Special verdict forms could also benefit 
prosecutors seeking to salvage a hung count. Section A of this Part 
proposes creating a federal rule of criminal procedure to standardize 
the use of special verdict forms in cases like Yeager—cases involving 
overlapping but not coextensive charges based on the same 
underlying conduct. As Section B explains, the proposal advocates for 
clarity and legitimacy for their own sake, along lines that will 
frequently favor defendants but may also favor the government. 
Indeed, the government is a beneficiary any time the jury is forced to 
be more rational. Section C concludes this Part by anticipating and 
responding to a likely critique of the proposal—that it would impinge 
on the jury’s traditional prerogative to exercise lenity. 
 
 124. See JONAKAIT, supra note 98, at 263 (“We do not want people ‘taking the law into their 
own hands.’”). 
 125. See ABRAMSON, supra note 123, at 61–62 (describing this “vicious side to jury 
nullification”). 
 126. Marder, supra note 76, at 901. In a highly controversial law review article, Professor 
Paul Butler openly encouraged African-American juries to engage in nullification to protest the 
criminal justice system’s treatment of African-American defendants. See Paul Butler, Racially 
Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 709–12 
(1995) (explaining that the jury is the only forum for democratic change accessible by African 
Americans). 
 127. John D. Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 477, 507 (2002) (“As 
society has become more heterogeneous and more complex, legislatures have to make difficult 
policy choices taking account of a range of considerations including morality, political feasibility 
and social and economic consequences and juries are just not equipped to reevaluate these 
policy judgments.”). 
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A.  The Proposal: A Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure on Special 
Verdicts 
The Framers could not have anticipated the need to apply the 
collateral estoppel doctrine in the criminal context to vindicate the 
protection against double jeopardy.128 Thus, the disconnect between 
the Framers’ preference for the general verdict, on the one hand, and 
the requirement of a determination of what a jury necessarily decided 
to invoke the collateral estoppel protection, on the other hand, is 
understandable. By constructing special verdict forms tracking the 
issues of underlying fact common to overlapping but not coextensive 
charges, trial courts can bridge this gap and shore up the defendant’s 
protection against double jeopardy. 
In contrast to the ex post solution proposed by other 
commentators,129 this Note recommends pre-verdict intervention to 
ascertain the preclusive effect of an acquittal in cases like Yeager. Pre-
verdict intervention is consistent with the Supreme Court’s systemic 
reluctance to engage in post-verdict scrutiny, for which there is a 
sound policy rationale.130 Insulating jury deliberations promotes full 
and frank communication,131 protects jurors from harassment,132 and 
helps ensure finality of process.133 The Supreme Court has invoked 
these concerns not only to justify its do-nothing approach to 
inconsistent verdicts134 but also to justify the longstanding rule that 
juror testimony is inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict.135 Indeed, 
 
 128. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 129. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 
1829 (1997) (“[T]he most sensible approach would be to allow (but not oblige) the defendant to 
request specific findings from the jury after the jury has rendered its general verdict.”); Randall, 
supra note 87, at 317–25 (proposing that acquitted defendants be given the opportunity to 
request a special interrogatory, but “only after the jury reaches a general verdict of acquittal”). 
 130. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 68−69 (1984). 
 131. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987). 
 132. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915) (arguing that allowing juror testimony to 
impeach a verdict would encourage “harass[ment] . . . by the defeated party in an effort to 
secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a 
verdict”). 
 133. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120 (“Allegations of juror misconduct, incompetency, or 
inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks, or months after the verdict, seriously 
disrupt the finality of the process.”). 
 134. See supra note 80. 
 135. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 121 (“Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) is grounded in the common-
law rule against admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict and the exception for juror 
testimony relating to extraneous influences.”). 
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the insulation of the jury’s verdict from second-guessing is a feature 
without which the criminal justice system could not likely survive.136 
As Professor Mark Brodin has observed, “the history of the jury 
is one of constant tension between the desire to preserve its 
independence on the one hand and to constrain its discretion on the 
other.”137 This Note respectfully suggests that, in light of the problem 
illustrated by Yeager, the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
through its Committee on Criminal Rules, consider drafting and 
adopting a special verdict form for use in cases like Yeager involving 
overlapping but not coextensive charges based on the same 
underlying facts.  
Establishing a federal rule of criminal procedure in this vein 
would legitimize the use of special verdicts in the criminal context and 
promote uniform access to the collateral estoppel protection for 
similarly situated defendants. The new rule should be analogous to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49, which provides judges with two 
procedural options for using special verdict forms. But several of the 
options outlined in Rule 49 would need to be hemmed to fit the 
constitutional dimensions of the criminal context. 
Under the first procedural option described in Rule 49,138 the jury 
resolves specified factual issues and the judge determines whether the 
defendant is liable under the law controlling those facts. This 
procedure would not be acceptable in the criminal context. Under no 
circumstances may a federal judge direct a verdict of guilty in a 
criminal case.139 Under the second procedural option described in 
Rule 49,140 the jury returns forms for a general verdict as well as 
 
 136. Id. at 120 (“There is little doubt that postverdict investigation into juror misconduct 
would in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after irresponsible or 
improper juror behavior. It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system could survive such 
efforts to perfect it.”). 
 137. Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process—
The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15, 25–26 (1990). 
 138. The rule provides: “The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the 
form of a special written finding on each issue of fact. . . . by [either] submitting written 
questions susceptible of a categorical or other brief answer; submitting written forms of the 
special findings that might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or using any 
other method that the court considers appropriate.” FED. R. CIV. P. 49 (emphasis added) 
(headings omitted). 
 139. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105–06 (1895). 
 140. The rule provides: “The court may submit to the jury forms for a general verdict, 
together with written questions on one or more issues of fact that the jury must decide. The court 
must give the instructions and explanations necessary to enable the jury to render a general 
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written questions on one or more issues of fact that the jury must 
decide. This procedure would also require modification in the 
criminal context. In the civil context, the judge can use the jury’s 
answers to the special interrogatories to override its verdict.141 But in 
the criminal context, the jury must retain the power to make the 
ultimate determination of guilt.142  
Under the Due Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, a 
criminal defendant has the right to demand that the jury find him 
guilty of every element of the offense charged.143 Thus, trial judges are 
required to instruct the jury on every element of the offense.144 In 
addition, many judges—although they are not required to do so—will 
give the jury written instructions.145 Surveys have shown that lawyers 
and jurors generally favor giving the jury access to written 
instructions during deliberation.146 
 
verdict and answer the questions in writing, and must direct the jury to do both.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
49 (emphasis added) (headings omitted). 
 141. See KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY 
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 8.08, at 555 (5th ed. 2000) (explaining that, in the event that 
one or more of the jury’s answers “is irreconcilably inconsistent with the general verdict, the 
answers prevail and judgment may be entered pursuant to Civil Rule 58 in accordance with the 
answers notwithstanding the general verdict, or, the court may return the jury for further 
consideration of its answers and verdict or order a new trial”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 49 
(“When the general verdict and the answers are consistent, the court must approve, for entry 
under Rule 58, an appropriate judgment on the verdict and answers. . . . When the answers are 
consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court 
may [either] approve, for entry under Rule 58, an appropriate judgment according to the 
answers, notwithstanding the general verdict; direct the jury to further consider its answers and 
verdict; or order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or 
more is also inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment must not be entered; instead, the 
court must direct the jury to further consider its answers and verdict, or must order a new trial.” 
(headings omitted)). 
 142. The Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury “includes, of course, as its most important 
element, the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding of ‘guilty.’” 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993). 
 143. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995). 
 144. O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 141, § 7.03, at 470. 
 145. Id. at 509. In European countries, judges provide the jury with detailed written 
information to guide their deliberations. See Jackson, supra note 127, at 518 (noting that judges 
in Belgium, Demark, and Norway provide juries with “a written list of ingredients concerning 
each offence, possible defenses and mitigating factors”). Spain, in particular, has an extremely 
accountable jury system. Id. at 518–19 (explaining that in Spain “the parties draw up with the 
judge a document containing the facts put forward by the prosecution and defense in the course 
of the trial” and then “[a]fter voting on each of these issues, the jury has to draw up a document 
under the five headings of the facts declared proved, the facts not proved, the declaration guilty 
or not guilty, the reasons for why they consider the facts proved or not and, finally, the voting 
incidents during deliberation”). 
 146. William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 119, 131. 
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Special verdict forms tracking the overlapping issues of law and 
fact in cases like Yeager would aid the jury in its deliberations. As is 
the practice with jury instructions, the judicial conferences for each 
district could draft model special verdict forms tracking the general 
overlap between overlapping but not coextensive charges. Then, the 
parties could adapt the general form to fit the specific issues in the 
case. The trial judge would arbitrate the parties’ negotiation of the 
forms. 
The procedures governing the formulation of special verdict 
forms should mirror those governing jury instructions found in 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30.147 Specifically, parties should 
submit their requests for special verdict forms to the judge and other 
parties at the close of evidence.148 And, just as Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 30 gives the court broad discretion to determine 
the propriety of requested instructions,149 this Note’s proposal would 
vest discretion in the trial judge to determine the ultimate content of 
special verdict forms. The judge should show the trial lawyers the 
special verdict forms before closing arguments “so that [counsel] may 
intelligently argue the case to the jury.”150 The court must also give 
counsel an opportunity to object to special verdict forms before they 
are submitted to the jury, as is the practice with regard to jury 
instructions.151 To ensure that the trial court has an opportunity, 
before the jury retires, to address any errors in a special verdict form, 
the failure to make a timely objection should operate as it does with 
instructions: unless there has been “plain error affecting substantial 
rights,”152 the right to object on appeal to the instructions made to the 
jury is waived.153 As in the civil context, timely objections to special 
 
 147. FED. R. CRIM. P. 30. 
 148. Cf. id. 
 149. See O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 141, § 7.03, at 466 (explaining that it is in the court’s 
discretion to refuse requests that are biased, unclear, or redundant). 
 150. United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 220 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. 
Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1262 (3d Cir. 1979)). 
 151. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 30 (“A party who objects to any portion of the instructions or to a 
failure to give a requested instruction must inform the court of the specific objection and the 
grounds for the objection before the jury retires to deliberate. An opportunity must be given to 
object out of the jury’s hearing and, on request, out of the jury’s presence.”); O’MALLEY ET AL., 
supra note 141, § 7.04, at 480–81 (“Objections, under the civil and criminal rules, must be made 
out of the hearing of the jury, and upon request in criminal cases, out of the jury’s presence.”). 
 152. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 
 153. See id. 30(d) (“Failure to object in accordance with this rule precludes appellate review, 
except as permitted under Rule 52(b).”); O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 141, § 7.01, at 457 
(“Failure to interpose a timely and specific objection to possible error or omission in the 
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verdict forms should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard.154 
Given the presumption of innocence and the traditional 
preference for using general verdicts, a trial judge arbitrating the 
negotiation of special verdict forms should give solicitude to the 
defendant. The judge must take care in drafting special 
interrogatories to avoid inappropriately leading the jury’s 
deliberations. The judge should also give great weight to a 
defendant’s objection to a special verdict form.155 
Courts tend to accept special interrogatories proposed to benefit 
defendants,156 but they do not typically submit special interrogatories 
to the jury over the defendant’s objection.157 This latter tactic is not 
viewed favorably on appeal. In United States v. Spock,158 for example, 
the First Circuit held that it was prejudicial for the district court to 
submit, over the defendants’ timely objection to their form and 
content, ten yes or no questions to the jury to be answered in addition 
to the general verdict.159 
If agreement on a special verdict form cannot be reached, it may 
be necessary to default to the general verdict. In United States v. 
Ogando,160 for example, the defendants requested blank-form special 
interrogatories on the predicates to a continuing criminal enterprise 
charge. The judge preferred constructing a multiple-choice form, 
reasoning that the complexity of the case required more instruction 
 
instructions made by the trial court results in waiver of the objection on appeal unless there has 
been plain error affecting substantial rights.”). 
 154. Giving judges the discretion over the submission, form, and content of special verdict 
forms introduces the potential for abuse of that discretion. In the civil context, abuse of this 
discretion constitutes reversible error, O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 141, § 8.10, at 572 (“A trial 
court’s refusal to utilize a special verdict or interrogatory requested by the defendant is subject 
to an abuse of discretion standard.”), but reversal occurs rarely, id. at 541. 
 155. See Kate H. Nepveu, Beyond “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”: Giving Special Verdicts in 
Criminal Jury Trials, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 298 (2003) (“If there would be serious 
harm to the defendant . . . then the court should not give the special verdict, even if the benefit 
would be great.”). 
 156. Randall, supra note 87, at 322. 
 157. JONAKAIT, supra note 98, at 251 (“Federal and state courts usually do not allow special 
verdicts or interrogatories if the criminal defendant objects to their use.”). 
 158. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969). 
 159. See id. at 182–83 (“There is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a verdict of 
guilty than to approach it step by step.”). 
 160. United States v. Ogando, 968 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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for the jury.161 The defendants rejected the judge’s proposed 
alternatives, however, and general verdicts were ultimately used.162 
B.  The Benefits of the Proposal to Defendants and the Criminal 
Justice System at Large 
The offenses in the Yeager case—insider trading and securities 
fraud—are good candidates for using a special verdict form. The same 
underlying conduct can sustain a conviction on both charges, but the 
charges do not necessarily require the same proof in a given case. 
That is, the charges are overlapping but not coextensive. The 
securities fraud charges against Yeager were brought under 15 U.S.C 
§ 78j(b), 15 U.S.C § 78ff, and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.163 The indictment 
alleged that Yeager “made false and misleading statements at the 
January 20, 2000, analyst conference or that he failed to state facts 
necessary to prevent statements made by others from being 
misleading.”164 The insider trading charges were brought under 15 
U.S.C § 78j(b), 15 U.S.C § 78ff, and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1.165 The 
indictment alleged that Yeager “made 20 separate sales of Enron 
stock ‘while in the possession of material non-public information 
regarding the technological capabilities, value, revenue and business 
performance of [EBS].’”166 
Although the securities fraud and insider trading charges in 
Yeager’s case appear very similar on the elements,167 they are not 
 
 161. Id. at 147–48. 
 162. Id. at 148. 
 163. Yeager v. United States (Yeager III), 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2363 n.1 (2009). 
 164. Id. at 2363. 
 165. Id. at 2363 n.1. 
 166. Id. at 2363–64 (quoting Fifth Superseding Indictment at 31, United States v. Hirko, No. 
H-03-93-05, 2004 WL 5653075 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2004). 
 167. Yeager’s jury was instructed that, to convict on the securities fraud charges, the 
government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
(1) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the defendant either (i) 
employed a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (ii) made any untrue statement 
or material omission of fact, or (iii) engaged in an act of fraud and deceit; and (2) 
acted willfully, knowingly, and with the intent to defraud; and (3) used, or caused to 
be used, any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails. 
United States v. Yeager (Yeager I), 446 F. Supp. 2d 719, 730 (S.D. Tex. 2006). To convict on 
insider trading, the jury was instructed that the government was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that: 
(1) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the defendant employed a 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (2) acted willfully, knowingly, and with the 
intent to defraud; (3) used, or caused to be used, any means or instrumentality of 
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coextensive. Both the securities fraud and insider trading charges 
required the government to prove a knowing violation of Section 
10(b)168 and Section 32(a)169 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
But whereas the securities fraud counts alleged a violation of SEC 
Rule 10b-5,170 the insider trading counts alleged a violation of SEC 
Rule 10b5-1, which the SEC adopted in 2000.171 Under Rule 10b5-1, a 
trade is “on the basis” of material nonpublic information when the 
trader is “aware” of material nonpublic information when making a 
purchase or sale, based on the “position that one who is aware of 
 
interstate commerce; and (4) used material, nonpublic information in his purchase or 
sale of Enron stock. 
Id. 
 168. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) makes it unlawful 
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-
based swap agreement . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 169. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) criminalizes willful violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934: 
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter . . . or any rule or 
regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or the observance of 
which is required under the terms of this chapter, or any person who willfully and 
knowingly makes, or causes to be made, any statement in any application, report, or 
document required to be filed under this chapter, or any rule or regulation 
thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in 
subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, or by any self-regulatory organization in 
connection with an application for membership or participation therein or to become 
associated with a member thereof, which statement was false or misleading with 
respect to any material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000,000, 
or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, except that when such person is a 
person other than a natural person, a fine not exceeding $25,000,000 may be imposed; 
but no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of 
any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or 
regulation. 
Id. § 78ff(a). 
 170. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 provides: 
  It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
  (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
  (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
  (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). 
 171. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154 (Aug. 15, 2000). 
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inside information at the time of trading will have inevitably made 
use of such information.”172 Under the classical theory of insider 
trading, it suffices for conviction to prove that an insider defendant 
traded while in possession of material, nonpublic information. This 
violates the “relationship of trust and confidence [that exists] between 
the shareholders of a corporation and [the] insider[] who ha[s] 
obtained confidential information by reason of their position with 
that corporation.”173 
Yeager’s indictment did not specify whether alleged false 
statements and omissions made at the 2000 analyst conference and in 
press releases were directly linked to the allegations that Yeager 
possessed insider information.174 Yeager, however, argued that the 
indictment implied this direct link.175 In Yeager I the district court 
noted that insider trading counts did not mention the 2000 analyst 
conference or the press releases and concluded that “the fate of the 
insider trading counts is not necessarily decided by the fate of 
the . . . securities fraud counts.”176 But the Fifth Circuit settled the 
issue in Yeager’s favor, concluding that, “the jury, acting rationally, 
could have acquitted Yeager on securities fraud only by concluding 
that he did not have insider information.”177  
If the Fifth Circuit’s Ashe analysis is accurate, then Yeager’s jury 
either was confused, struck a compromise, or exercised its power to 
dispense lenity when it acquitted Yeager on the securities charges 
without also acquitting him on the insider trading charges. On 
 
 172. MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 347 (4th ed. 2007). 
 173. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (footnote omitted); see also United 
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997) (“Under the ‘traditional’ or ‘classical theory’ of 
insider trading liability, [the rules] are violated when a corporate insider trades in the securities 
of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information.”). 
 174. Fifth Superseding Indictment at 21–22, United States v. Hirko, No. H-03-93-05, 2004 
WL 5653075 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2004); see also United States v. Yeager (Yeager I), 446 F. Supp. 
2d 719, 728–29 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“Furthermore, the insider trading counts against Defendant 
Yeager do not rely upon allegations of false statements and omissions made at the 2000 Analyst 
Conference and in press releases. The title of the insider trading counts does not mention the 
2000 Analyst Conference and press releases, and nor does the text of the counts.”). 
 175. Yeager I, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 726 (“With regard to the insider trading counts, Defendant 
Yeager specifically argues that ‘[a]t no point did the Government explain what material, 
nonpublic information Yeager was in possession of except by implication: when he allegedly 
made statements or omissions at the 2000 Analyst Conference and in press releases, Yeager 
knew that those statements were false, and that knowledge constituted material, nonpublic 
information that he was not permitted to trade on.’” (citation omitted)). 
 176. Id. at 729. 
 177. United States v. Yeager (Yeager II), 521 F.3d 367, 376–77 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit upheld this 
reading of the record.178 Had Yeager been able to request a special 
verdict form with interrogatories clarifying the issues of ultimate fact 
common to the insider trading and fraud charges, the jury may not 
have deadlocked, resulting in an acquittal on both sets of charges. 
Although using special verdicts in cases like Yeager will 
frequently favor defendants, their use could sometimes favor the 
government. If Yeager I’s Ashe analysis was correct, for example, then 
Yeager’s jury acted rationally in acquitting him of securities fraud yet 
failing to reach a verdict on the insider trading charges. Under this 
scenario, the government should not be barred from reprosecuting 
him on the insider trading charges.179 Had the jury been given a 
special verdict form with interrogatories tracking the underlying 
issues of fact common to the securities and insider trading charges, it 
might have revealed a rational deadlock based on the evidence. 
Considering the disparate Ashe analyses in Yeager I and II, it is 
possible that the jury would have split the charges rationally if given 
such a special verdict form. From the government’s perspective, a 
mixed outcome that is demonstrably rational is better than the 
apparently irrational result in Yeager. A rational mistried charge can 
be salvaged without implicating collateral estoppel concerns.180 
Ideally, engaging in a forward-looking analysis at the close of 
evidence and constructing special verdict forms clarifying the issues 
would prevent jury mistake and confusion altogether.181 As one 
 
 178. United States v. Yeager (Yeager IV), 334 F. App’x 707, 709 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Today, 
freed from the chains of Larkin it is clear under our initial Ashe analysis the jury made a finding 
in acquitting Yeager that precludes prosecution on insider trading . . . . We are satisfied that the 
panel conducted a proper review of Yeager’s claim and the required collateral estoppel analysis 
under Ashe and will not do so again. We decline the invitation to revisit our settled findings.”). 
 179. See infra note 180. 
 180. See Preliminary Proceedings: Prosecutorial Discretion, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. 
PROC. 219, 452 (2009) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit a retrial following a 
mistrial if, ‘taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for 
[declaring a mistrial], or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated [by not allowing 
a retrial].’” (citation omitted)). 
 181. Field experiments have shown that juries that are given special verdict forms are better 
informed about the evidence, more understanding of the judge’s instructions, and more 
confident in the accuracy of their verdict. See, e.g., Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial 
Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 29 
(1994) (finding that the use of special verdict forms provided the greatest benefits by assisting 
jurors with legal and evidentiary complexity); Elizabeth C. Wiggins & Steven J. Breckler, 
Special Verdicts as Guides to Jury Decision Making, 14 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 1, 1 (1990) (finding 
partial support for the theory that special verdict forms improve comprehension of jury 
instructions). 
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commentator has noted, “the special verdict can improve the 
deliberation process by packaging the dispute in distinct, manageable 
components, by focusing the jurors’ attention on those critical issues, 
and by exerting pressure on them to decide those issues based solely 
on the evidence because their special findings will be recorded.”182 By 
clarifying what the jury necessarily decided, a special verdict form 
could improve an acquitted defendant’s access to the collateral 
estoppel protection, minimizing the need for unnecessary relitigation 
and saving precious judicial and prosecutorial resources.183 In addition 
to reducing the need for post-trial expenditure of these resources, 
special verdicts can also save resources during the trial by 
“expedit[ing] litigation because instructions are easier for the judge to 
frame at trial.”184 
C.  Anticipating and Responding to the Lenity Critique 
When it comes to the form of a verdict, there is a tradeoff 
between lenity and precision: preserving the possibility of 
nullification by using the general verdict sacrifices clarity and 
accuracy. For two reasons, the tradeoff between lenity and precision 
weighs in favor of using special verdict forms in cases involving 
multiple overlapping but coextensive federal criminal charges. First, 
the risk that a jury will return inconsistent verdicts out of mistake or 
confusion is heightened when the substance185 or sheer volume186 of 
the evidence challenges the limits of the jurors’ memories and 
understanding. Second, defendants charged with multiple, 
overlapping offenses are more vulnerable to successive prosecution, 
placing accuracy at a premium. 
Critics of this Note’s proposal will likely argue that guilty 
defendants will be worse off if juries are unable to nullify under the 
cover of the general verdict. There are two responses to this 
 
 182. Brodin, supra note 137, at 58 (footnote omitted). 
 183. Randall, supra note 87, at 319. 
 184. Brodin, supra note 137, at 59 (explaining that in general verdict jury trials, “the judge 
must fully instruct the jury both on the law and its application to all possible constructions of the 
evidence”). 
 185. See, e.g., United States v. Korando, 29 F.3d 1114, 1115−18 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(characterizing the government’s efforts to explain the structure of a racketeering scheme in 
violation of RICO as “decidedly less than elegant”). 
 186. See, e.g., United States v. Ogando, 968 F.2d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that cases 
involving a continuing course of criminal conduct or multiple defendants may require a “recall 
of Homeric proportions” from jurors). 
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argument. First, even when special verdict forms are employed, juries 
disposed to acquit the defendant against the weight of the evidence 
could still do so based on reasonable doubt.187 Indeed, the special 
verdict form should include a question paralleling the reasonable 
doubt instruction that the jury receives. Thus, if it intends to nullify, 
the jury can indicate on the special verdict form that the government 
failed to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The second response to the argument that defendants will be 
worse off if special verdict forms are given to the jury is this: various 
changes in the criminal justice system since the Framers’ time have 
affected the degree to which the nullification-regarding features of 
the system actually serve the interests of defendants. The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, for example, greatly limit the jury’s ability to 
bring the defendant’s punishment in line with what the jury perceives 
to be the defendant’s crime against society.188 Although a jury might 
intuit that convicting a defendant of fewer counts will reduce the 
defendant’s ultimate punishment,189 so long as the jury convicts the 
defendant on at least one count, all relevant conduct—including 
acquitted conduct—can typically be introduced at the sentencing 
phase.190 Short of acquitting the defendant of all charges,191 a jury can 
 
 187. Marder, supra note 76, at 885–87 (noting that jurors “could nullify, but then say that 
their decision was based on reasonable doubt”); see also JONAKAIT, supra note 98, at 258 
(explaining that jurors who acquit despite strong evidence of guilt consistently report having 
reasonable doubts, as opposed to disregarding the law). 
 188. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), preserved real offense sentencing by 
making the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory. Id. at 246. The available evidence shows 
that most judges still follow the Guidelines even though they are no longer mandatory. See 
NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 
240–44 (4th. ed. Supp. 2008) (providing empirical evidence that most judges post-Booker have 
followed the Guidelines). For a discussion of the jury’s evolving role in criminal sentencing, see 
Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of 
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 34–44 (2003). 
 189. See United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1960) (“The vogue for 
repetitious multiple count indictments may well produce an increase in seemingly inconsistent 
jury verdicts, where in fact the jury is using its power to prevent the punishment from getting 
too far out of line with the crime.” (citation omitted)). 
 190. See Leipold, supra note 21, at 1332 (“The Federal Sentencing Guidelines require the 
judge to look at all the charged conduct, and increase the sentence if a preponderance of the 
evidence suggests guilt on the acquitted charges. . . . The imprecision of the general verdict 
permits this second evaluation of the evidence.” (footnote omitted)); Muller, supra note 70, at 
776 (“[I]t has become increasingly common for courts to sentence defendants on the basis of 
conduct of which they were acquitted—even inconsistently acquitted.” (footnote omitted)); see 
also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam) (holding that “a jury’s verdict 
of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the 
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only influence the severity of the defendant’s sentence by convicting 
the defendant only on the charge or charges with the lowest statutory 
maximum.192 This is unlikely because the jury is not instructed on the 
sentencing consequences attached to the various charges.193 
The Supreme Court’s nostalgia for the Framers’ vision of 
nullification as a tyranny-preventive device is in tension with modern 
district court judges’ efforts to nullification-proof the courtroom.194 In 
contrast to the practice in the Framers’ day,195 nullification advocacy 
by defense counsel is strictly prohibited.196 Most modern jurors are 
completely unaware that they have the discretion to acquit a guilty 
defendant,197 and judges exclude jurors who demonstrate willingness 
to engage in nullification.198 “In most instances today, for jury 
 
acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence”). 
 191. But see Leipold, supra note 21, at 1331–32 (“As every defense lawyer knows, an 
acquittal on fewer than all charges may be a hollow victory. . . . Thus, if defendant is charged 
with committing three bank robberies, and the jury convicts on the first count and acquits on the 
other two, the judge may still punish the defendant as if he had been convicted on all three 
counts.” (footnote omitted)). 
 192. In this event, the ceiling imposed by the statutory maximum would prevent acquitted 
conduct from coming in. Of course, the number of convicted counts—which the jury does 
control—can make a difference in terms of the defendant’s stigma and ultimate punishment 
under the Guidelines. But jurors are never instructed about the sentencing implications of their 
decisions. See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of 
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1134 n.249 (2001) (“Juries are not told about penalties and 
indeed are forbidden to consider them.”). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See GERTNER & MIZNER, supra note 15, at 197 (“Concomitant with the refusal to 
instruct the jury concerning nullification, courts have further held that counsel may not argue 
that theory in closing argument . . . .”). 
 195. For example, Alexander Hamilton urged jurors to disregard their instructions and 
consider the propriety of the law in the seditious libel case of American journalist John Peter 
Zenger, and the jury returned its now-famous not guilty verdict. See ABRAMSON, supra note 
123, at 73−75. 
 196. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (refusing to instruct 
the jury on nullification, reasoning that “[a]n explicit instruction to a jury conveys an implied 
approval that runs the risk of degrading the legal structure requisite for true freedom, for an 
ordered liberty that protects against anarchy as well as tyranny”). 
 197. See Marder, supra note 76, at 944 (“Jurors, who may have little knowledge of the 
history of the jury, may have no familiarity with the jury’s power to nullify.” (footnote 
omitted)); see also David C. Brody & Craig Rivera, Examining the Dougherty “All-Knowing 
Assumption”: Do Jurors Know About Their Jury Nullification Power?, 33 CRIM. L. BULL. 151, 
166 (1997) (explaining that most people do not know about the jury’s ability to nullify). 
 198. Nullification-intent jurors have been dismissed even after the jury has begun to 
deliberate. For example, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d 
Cir. 1997), that a trial judge alerted to the fact that a juror is urging nullification should 
interview the juror and remove him upon confirmation of his intent to nullify. Id. at 617. This 
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nullification to succeed, it must remain subterranean, 
unacknowledged, and undetected.”199 Therefore, the practice of 
nullification has lost a significant part of its tyranny-preventive value; 
covert nullification does not give the legislature any incentive to fix 
problem statutes.200 
Finally, although nullification has existed since colonial days, 
some commentators reject the idea that nullification has any legal 
basis.201 For example, Professor Andrew Leipold has observed that 
the courts have never explicitly approved nullification nor is there 
historical evidence that nullification is “embedded” in the Sixth 
Amendment.202 
CONCLUSION 
Whether borne of confusion, compromise, or lenity, jury 
inconsistency harms defendants’ constitutionally protected interest in 
the finality of acquittals. In today’s overfederalized and 
overcriminalized system, the average defendant’s interest in 
improving accuracy outweighs a defendant’s interest in preserving the 
possibility of nullification. Especially when multiple charges require 
the resolution of a common issue of ultimate fact, clarifying the 
overlapping issues and what the jury actually decides would protect a 
defendant. 
In contrast, a general verdict can harm a defendant. In Yeager’s 
case, for example, the opacity of the jury’s acquittals precluded him 
from barring relitigation of issues of fact common to the acquittals 
and the hung counts. 
 
case required the court to navigate the conflict between the trial judge’s “duty to dismiss jurors 
for misconduct” and the duty to “safeguard[] the secrecy of jury deliberations.” Id. at 618. After 
weighing the competing interests, the court concluded that, once jury deliberations begin, trial 
judges should only interfere when issues are brought to their attention. Id. at 621–22. The trial 
judge had dismissed one juror after receiving a note from another juror that this juror had a 
“predisposed disposition” to nullify. Id. at 611. The Second Circuit took issue not with the trial 
judge’s ability to dismiss a juror who is intent on nullification but with the fact that the trial 
judge dismissed the juror without making sufficient inquiry on his intent to nullify. Id. at 618. 
 199. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 240 (2007). 
 200. See Marder, supra note 76, at 906 (“[I]f jurors nullify to militate against the effects of a 
bad law, they reduce the legislature’s incentive to act, thus increasing the chances that a bad law 
will remain on the books. A nullifying jury only masks the defective law by attempting to fix it 
on an ad hoc basis when what is required is a uniform correction.”). 
 201. See, e.g., Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 
54 TEX. L. REV. 488, 504 (1976). 
 202. Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 283 (1996). 
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A federal rule of criminal procedure giving district court judges 
discretion to submit special verdict forms to the jury would make 
their use more routine and uniform in the criminal context. The 
prevention of jury mistake and the preclusion of unnecessary 
relitigation would not only protect defendants from double jeopardy 
but would also promote efficiency in the allocation of scarce judicial 
and prosecutorial resources. This savings should substantially offset 
the costs associated with formulating special verdict forms upon 
which the parties can agree. 
